Abstract

This text analyses the rule of example and the function of parody in the transmission of psychoanalysis made by the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. The subject of fault or discrepancy that operates between the example and the exemplified concept and the way in which discrepancy settles in a logic of (non)-coding, which is analogous to that of dreams, is addressed from the Lacanian concept of the relation between the universal statement and the particular statement thus constituting itself the factor of invention and theory of subjectivation. Žižeks, spasmodic position is directed towards the parodic detachment of the object voice, just as the repetition and saturation in the use of examples is directed towards the emergence of the “pure function of example”, of existence without essence (object to). The article examines how this materialistic conception fits in a rhetoric of parody which would be inherent to the transmission of psychoanalysis – parody understood, not as a discursive genre, but as a structuring medium of the language, as a resource to subjectivize the limit or failure of language in relation to a certain condition of unrepresentability of the object. Would Žižek be “truly Lacanian” assuming a “postmodern posture” to cope with the object voice?

Keywords: Žižek | transmission | example | parody | voice